Buying pearl jewelry can be fun, exciting and confusing. Whether you're considering a gift of pearl jewelry for someone special or as a treat for yourself, take some time to learn the terms used in the industry. Here's some information to help you get the best quality pearl jewelry for your money, whether you're shopping in a traditional brick and mortar store or online. Pearls Natural or real pearls are made by oysters and other mollusks. Cultured pearls also are grown by mollusks, but with human intervention; that is, an irritant introduced into the shells causes a pearl to grow. Imitation pearls are man-made with glass, plastic, or organic materials. Because natural pearls are very rare, most pearls used in jewelry are either cultured or imitation pearls. Cultured pearls, because they are made by oysters or mollusks, usually are more expensive than imitation pears. A cultured pearl's value is largely based on its size, usually stated in millimeters, and the quality of its nacre coating, which give it luster. Jewelers should tell your if the pearls are cultured or imitation. Some black, bronze, gold, purple, blue and orange pearls, whether natural or cultured, occur that way in nature; some, however, are dyed through various processes. Jewelers should tell you whether the colored pearls are naturally colored, dyed or irradiated. Clams, oysters, mussels and many other mollusks with limy shells are known to produce pearls. But very few kinds yield gem pearls of jeweler's quality. The pearl is an abnormal growth of mother-of-pearl, or nacre, imbedded in the soft bodies of these shellfish. It is built up, layer upon layer, in the same way as nacre is added to the lining of the growing shell and always has the same color and luster. For example, over the country, hundreds of good-sized pearls are found each year in the oysters we eat. Unfortunately these have no commercial value regardless of whether they have been cooked or not because they are dull opaque white or purple like the shell of the parent oyster. In recent times almost all pearls of gem quality come from the oriental pearl oyster which has a bright shimmering translucent nacre. A pearl starts growing when some irritating foreign substance such as a sand grain, bit of mud, parasite or other object becomes lodged in the shell-producing gland called the mantle. Pearls formed in the soft flesh where nacre can be added on all sides are most likely to be spherical and the most highly prized. By far the great majority are flattened or variously distorted and have little value. Size, color, luster and freedom from flaws are other essential qualities. Unlike other gems, such as diamonds, pearls have an average life of only about 50 years. In time the small amount of water in a pearl's make-up is lost and its surface cracks. Because they are mostly lime, necklaces which are worn often are injured by the acid secretions of the human skin.

Goldman, the institution that came through last year¡¯s financial crisis best ¨C arguably the only pure investment bank left standing ¨C will say how much money it made in pearl jewelry wholesale the third quarter (a lot) and how many billions it has stored for bonuses (about $5.5bn towards a likely 2009 bonus pool of $23bn).

For believers in Goldman¡¯s ethical standards and way of doing business, these are difficult times. Although it avoided the mistakes that brought down Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, forced Merrill Lynch into Bank of America¡¯s arms, and prodded Morgan Stanley further into lower-risk retail broking, Goldman has become a whipping boy.

There is outrage that, having taken government money to survive the crash, Goldman is in such rude health that it will hand out billions in bonuses. Matt Taibbi, a Rolling Stone writer, caught the mood memorably by describing Goldman as ¡°a giant vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity¡±.

Such is Goldman¡¯s importance to Wall Street and regulation that I am devoting a pair of columns to it. Today, I will discuss the Goldman problem (different and less egregious to what Mr Taibbi believes, but still a problem). Next week, I will suggest what should be done about it by regulators and the bank itself.

Goldman executives were wounded by how seriously Mr Taibbi¡¯s piece was taken despite their riposte that vampire squids are small creatures that present no danger to humanity. He accused it of profiting from bubbles such as the US internet and housing booms, and of repeatedly ¡°selling investments they know are crap¡± to retail investors.

But, amusing though his article was, Mr Taibbi mischaracterised Goldman. Its run of success since its 1999 initial public offering has not been based on ¡°pump and dump¡± broking but on sticking obstinately to the institutional, less-regulated elite end of the market.

While others such as Morgan Stanley and Merrill have wavered, Goldman has steadily built a widely envied list of clients among blue-chip companies, hedge funds and private equity firms. It has used its superior network and information to invest, and trade with, its capital.

One rival Wall Street executive describes Goldman (with rueful admiration) as ¡°a bunch of clever thugs¡±. He means that Goldman has been tough about seizing profitable opportunities even if that involves, for example, bidding for an asset against a former client.

Whatever Goldman is doing to make money, it works. Between 2000 and 2008, its average ratio of pre-tax profits to revenues was 29 per cent ¨C one of the highest in the cultured freshwater pearl Fortune 500, even after allocating nearly half its revenues to bonuses.

That was a cause for concern before the crisis, but Goldman was playing in the big leagues and its clients, from large corporations to wealthy individuals, could ¨C at least in theory ¨C take care of themselves. Equally, its shareholders knew it was betting with their capital.

What changed things was the financial crisis. Hank Paulson, the former Goldman chief executive who was then Treasury secretary, first let Lehman Brothers founder and then rescued American International Group by settling at par its credit default swaps with banks including Goldman.

Goldman received $10bn in government capital (which it has paid back) and issued $21bn in bonds backed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It turned into a bank holding company, and then a financial holding company to allow it to keep, among other things, its private equity arm.

Not only is it reasonable to suspect that Goldman, which has entwined itself with governments around the world by sending partners out into ¡°public service¡± when they leave, would not be allowed to fail by its alumnae network, but the bail-out was prima facie evidence.

Thus, at the heart of the financial system, now sits a pearl earrings professionals-only, high-risk Wall Street firm with its own private equity and hedge funds arrayed on top of a nonpareil corporate and government client list, which taxpayers reasonably assume is gambling with their money.

An interesting little item here, on the banning of the works of Noam Chomsky from the prison library at Guantanamo Bay. One has to wonder about the mentality of the
pearl jewelry Pentagon lawyer, who was trying to obtain a copy of Chomsky for one of the detainees he is representing. Maybe his job at Guantanamo has led him to cultured pearl jewelry entertain all sorts of subversive thoughts?

Chomsky predictably interpets the ban on his work as further evidence that the US is slipping towards totalitarianism. But I see it another way. Obama has said that he is cultured freshwater pearl banning the use of torture on prisoners at Guantanamo. Subjecting them to the works of Noam Chomsky is clearly incompatible with the torture ban.

The basic structure of our healthcare system is the major reason we spend twice as much per capita as other developed countries with, at best, no difference in outcomes. We behave as though being ¡°deficit neutral¡± for new healthcare programmes is adequate, when this does nothing about the unsustainable long-term costs of existing programmes.

At the core of our sick system is a set of perverse incentives for providers, employers and patients that must be addressed. I am under no illusions that I have all the akoya pearl jewelry answers, but I have some key questions about the underlying cost drivers.

Why do we incentivise procedures rather than outcomes? The basis of the federal fee-for-service system is not value or health outcomes but rather the volume of procedures (diagnostics, tests, follow-up visits) ¨C which shifts revenues to service providers. Meanwhile, the consumer considers the services to be ¡°free¡± because someone else appears to be paying. The result is that the providers have every incentive to spend more and the consumer every incentive to agree. The cost impacts are everywhere. Per capita, the US has five times more CT scans than Germany and five times as many coronary bypasses as France.

Why do we tolerate inexplicable variations in healthcare costs across the country? Consider the fact that some parts of the US have six times more back operations and six times more prostate removals than others. We should gather data to determine best practices and share them nationally.

Shouldn¡¯t we focus not simply on who gets covered but on what gets covered? While I am not suggesting that the government decide when intervention is appropriate, it makes sense to explore how to encourage living wills and other ways of redirecting Medicare spending in the pearl necklace last year of life. After all, that is about 30 per cent of Medicare expenditure. La Crosse, Wisconsin now has 95 per cent of its population with living wills and its costs in the last two years of life are 20 per cent lower than the national average.

When will we reform the malpractice system? An estimated 3 to 9 per cent of Medicare costs are related to defensive medicine. Special medical courts might be a way of moderating malpractice costs. We might also consider a ¡°safe harbour¡± to protect those who use evidence-based practices.

Why not standardise administrative and regulatory processes? Our private health insurance system spends up to $200bn in ¡°excess¡± administrative spending to cover people, bill for services and make payments.

Can¡¯t we replicate integrated healthcare clinics on a national scale? Through full sharing of patient information among the involved doctors, these systems show it is possible to pearl earrings improve outcomes and save costs.

Why is it so difficult for insurers to operate across state lines? According to the American Medical Association, in 15 states, one insurer had at least 50 per cent of the market. That cries out for more competition. To this end, we could create a sensible system of insurance exchanges to organise consumers into large purchasing blocs.